After a period of growing disconnectedness of regional markets following the 1992 price liberalization in Russia, a process of improvement in market integration started since about 1994. 
Introduction
Political changes and Russia's rapid shift in the early 1990s from the centrally planned economy to one governed by market principles gave rise to a dramatic regional fragmentation of its national market. The emergence of market institutions in the country turned this process back in about 1994. From that time on, a progressive improvement in market integration was observed, as DeJong (2001, 2003) and Gluschenko (2003) found. Obviously, integration of the Russian market is spatially heterogeneous: each region can be integrated with some set of other regions and not integrated with another set. Moreover, a feature of the transition process is that some regions, not being integrated, are nonetheless moving toward integration. The above papers consider the temporal pattern of market integration in Russia rather than the spatial pattern because they use cross-sectional analysis, so obtaining results averaged over country's regions.
The aim of this paper is to obtain the spatial pattern of goods market integration in Russia in 1994-2000, applying time series analysis. The spatial pattern is produced by classing each region with one of three groups: integrated with a benchmark region, not integrated but tending toward integration with it, or not integrated and not tending toward integration. The law of one price serves as the criterion of market integration. The data for the empirical analysis are time series of the cost of a staples basket across 75 (of all the 89) regions of Russia with a monthly frequency.
The variable to be analyzed is the price differential between a given region and the benchmark one. Given that it is stationary, the law of one price holds, hence these regions are integrated. The conventional AR(1) model with no unit root describes such a behavior of the price differential. The movement toward integration is a nonstationary process that tends to stationarity over time. Such a process is modeled by an autoregression with a nonlinear, asymptotically decaying trend. Thus, a region is deemed tending toward integration when price in it converges to the benchmark-region price. If region's price differential satisfies no one of these two models, the region is deemed not integrated and not tending toward integration. The models are also augmented for taking account of a structural break caused by the 1998 financial crisis in Russia.
The results obtained suggest 54% of the covered Russian regions to be integrated with the benchmark region, 24% of regions tending toward integration with it, and 22% non-integrated with no trend toward integration.
Examining market integration in Russia through time series analysis has been the subject of studies by Berkowitz et al. (1998) , Gardner and Brooks (1994) , and Goodwin et al. (1999) .
Considering the early transition years, the first half of the 1990s, they find the Russian market poorly integrated with signs of potential improvement. The spatial patterns obtained suggest that only a few regions or cities can be deemed integrated in a certain sense. Berkowitz and DeJong (1999) , albeit applying a cross-sectional approach, find an interesting feature of the spatial pattern of Russia's market integration. They identify a Red Belt group of pro-Communist and anti-marketreform regions as a culprit behind segmentation of the Russian market. This paper contributes to the above literature in two aspects. From the methodological standpoint, it proposes a new methodology of analyzing price convergence in the time-series context. From the empirical standpoint, the paper is complementary to the above ones in the sense of a wider spatial and temporal coverage: the analysis covers almost all Russian regions and a time span ending in 2000 (albeit missing the very early years of transition, 1992-1994) . The results of this paper and DeJong (2001, 2003) and Gluschenko (2003) , taken jointly, provide a two-dimensional, time-space pattern of Russia's market integration from the early years of transition to the beginning of the 2000s.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes methodology of the analysis and the data used. Section 3 presents empirical results obtained. Section 4 concludes.
Methodology and data

Strategy of the analysis
Perfect integration of a spatially distributed goods market implies an absence of impediments to the movement of goods between all spatial segments (e.g., national regions). In other words, a perfectly integrated market would operate like a single market despite spatial dispersion of its segments. The price of a (tradable) good across regions would be uniform so that the law of one price, maintained by inter-regional arbitrage, holds. Thus, the law of one price may be used as a theoretical benchmark for empirically analyzing goods market integration.
Market integration in Russia can be seen as a two-stage process, involving an initial stage of progressive segmentation beginning in January 1992 and a second stage of increased integration beginning around 1994. The second stage is the subject of this study. Taking a pair of regions, it may be hypothesized that in this second stage of evolution, three types of the pairs can exist:
(a) integrated regions, where price equality already prevails; (b) non-integrated regions tending toward integration, i.e. prices are converging toward a common level; and (c) non-integrated regions that show no indication of an integrating trend. For brevity, hereafter regions from the second group are referred to as "regions tending toward integration," and regions from the third group are referred to as simply "non-integrated regions."
In the above context, the term convergence of prices becomes ambiguous. Indeed, when considering types (a) and (b), two fundamentally distinct concepts of convergence are possible. These two concepts can be described as follows: Fig. 1 (a) implies regions r and s are type (a). They are in spatial equilibrium, such that price disparities between regions are merely random shocks dying out over time. Prices fluctuate around parity and permanently tend to return to it. This is the case dealt with in the literature on the law of one price and purchasing power parity (PPP); it is sometimes referred to as "convergence to the implying their convergence to zero. It characterizes the short-run behavior of prices, the long-run behavior of prices being described by the path p rt /p st = 1, t = 0,…,T.
(1)
Thus, this concept can be designated as "short-run convergence." 
(In the figure, the price in s catches up with the price in r.) Price disparity permanently diminishes over time, fluctuating around this general trend due to random shocks. This is the case the literature on economic growth (regarding incomes, outputs, etc.) refers to simply as "convergence." Here, in the short run, the price disparity converges to the long-run path (i.e. random deviations die out over time), and the path itself converges to the parity line p rt /p st = 1 over the long run. In this case, "convergence" relates to the prices themselves, implying long-run convergence of their differences to zero over time. Thus, this concept can be designated as "longrun convergence."
1
In Formulae (1) and (2), absolute price parity is taken as the steady state. This implies perfect integration -a rare condition in the real world. We would reasonably expect persistent (equilibrium) difference in prices between r and s induced by natural market frictions such as physical distance and difficult access to a number of regions. Thus, it may be more realistic to relax the criterion for market integration, allowing for such market frictions. In such case, relative price parity would have to be dealt with, unity in the right-hand side of Formulae (1) and (2) being substituted for an arbitrary constant ratio of prices, α rs .
The trouble is that this α reflects both the effect of "natural," irremovable market frictions (which is compatible with the notion of integration) and the effect of artificial, transient ones that impede market integration. This can be formalized as, e.g., α = α n (L rs )⋅α a , where α n is the effect of transportations costs proxied by distance between r and s, L rs , and α a is the effect of "anti-integration forces." As Gluschenko (2010) finds, the latter effect is considerable in Russia. In the context of a pairwise time series analysis, however, there is no way to identify α n and α a separately. This is why the strict version of the law of one price is adopted in this study as a criterion of integration, any deterministic difference in prices being interpreted as an indication of non-integration. Certainly, this may result in some understatement of the degree of market integration in Russia.
Testing for the equality of prices or price levels, i.e. for relationship (1), is a conventional exercise in papers on the law of one price and PPP. The test is whether log local prices P rt = log(p rt ) and P st = ln(p st ) are cointegrated with the predetermined cointegrating vector (1, -1), or, equivalently, whether price differential P rst = log(p rt /p st ) is stationary. However, in providing an "all-or-nothing" answer, this traditional approach is impotent in revealing a transitional case described by relationship (2), i.e. the case when a process {P rst } t=0,…,T is not stationary, but tends to a stationary one over time. Using conventional cointegration analysis, such a process would be simply recognized as nonstationary, giving no way to separate region groups (b) and (c).
There are several approaches to this problem. The issue of long-run convergence is extensively addressed in the economic growth literature (see e.g. the survey by Durlauf and Quah, 1999) . The most popular is the cross-sectional approach (examining β-convergence); different methods associated with the distribution dynamics approach are also of considerable use. Both approaches yield a spatially aggregated result, not a spatial pattern of convergence. They are thus unsuitable for solving our proposed problem. Therefore let us turn to the time series approach. Carlino and Mills (1996) consider a concept referred to as "stochastic convergence." They employ a cointegration relationship with a deterministic linear trend. Provided that the trend of an inter-regional differential is directed toward zero, stationarity around this trend is supposed to be evidence of convergence. Cushman et al. (2001) apply a similar way to test for convergence of prices for foods in Kiev, Ukraine, to the prices for respective goods in the US. However, time series models with a linear trend are not compatible with relationship (2): having reached the zero value, the differential would be driven further by such a trend and increase again (in absolute value) with the opposite sign. Bernard and Durlauf (1995) define convergence essentially as in relationship (2), referring to such a concept as "forecast convergence." However, turning to the issue of testing for convergence, they assume economies to be already in the steady state and apply standard cointegration analysis. Thus, the authors actually restrict their definition of convergence to Equation (1). Which is to say the authors do not deal with "genuine," long-run convergence, examining only whether it has been completed by the beginning of a given time period.
2 Nahar and Inder (2002) attempt to overcome this shortcoming, suggesting a test for long-run convergence. Bentzen (2003) applies it to study convergence of gasoline prices in OECD countries. The idea of the Nahar-Inder test is as follows. The evolution of disparity between two locations is modeled as (log(P rst )) 2 = h(t) + ε t , where h(t) is a long-run trend, and ε t is a residual with standard properties. A polynomial of some degree k approximates function h(t), so that
decreasing with time; hence, dh(t)/dt < 0 must hold for all t. To test for convergence, the authors check whether the time average of this derivative is negative:
However, it is not equivalent to the negativity of dh(t)/dt in all points in time. Therefore, the test is not adequate. This is easy to see, considering a continuous-time counterpart of the above relationship:
Thus, merely the fact that h(T) < h(0) suffices to accept the convergence hypothesis. In the general case, this obviously does not evidence long-run convergence. For example, a U-shape path of disparity may satisfy this test. (Besides, the test does not take account of probable autocorrelation, which makes it impossible to discriminate between deterministic and stochastic trends.)
The failure of the Nahar-Inder method is due to too general representation of the long-run trend. A way out is to restrict the function class used to model the trend to functions a priory known to satisfy relationship (2). These are asymptotically decaying functions. Adopting this approach and taking a specific asymptotically decaying function to characterize the trend, convergence of prices can be modeled as
2 In the literature on economic growth, the term "convergence" had definitely meant catching-up until Bernard and Durlauf's (1995) paper caused confusion in this term similar to that in the literature on spatial price dynamics.
To economize notation, the region indices for parameters (and the disturbances discussed below) are suppressed. Parameter δ defines convergence rate; γ is the initial (at t = 0) value of price disparity. The sign of γ shows the direction of convergence. If γ < 0, the price in r increases faster than in s and catches up with the latter. If γ > 0, the price in r rises slower than in s. If γ = 0, Equation (3) degenerates to Equation (1), implying that convergence of prices has completed by the start of the time period under consideration. Hence, the law of one price holds for regions r and s.
Econometrics
To derive a testable version of relationship (3), the logarithmic representation of prices is used and random shocks, ν t , are taken into account. They are presumed to be a first-order autoregressive process:
where ε t is white noise, and γ, δ, and λ are parameters to be estimated. Hereafter, t = 1,…,T.
Substituting the second equation in (4) into the first gives a nonlinear model to be estimated and tested:
The tests have to answer whether time series {P rst } has no unit root, i.e. that the process is stationary, and if so, whether it contains a trend of the given form, i.e. γ ≠ 0 and δ ≠ 0. That is, the hypotheses tested are H λ : λ = 0 (against λ < 0), H γ : γ = 0 (against γ ≠ 0), and H δ : δ ≠ 0 (against δ = 0).
The joint rejection of H λ , H γ , and H δ is interpreted as evidence that the time series tested fluctuates around a deterministic trend of the given form. Provided that δ < 0, the trend is an asymptotically decaying one. Hence, prices in regions r and s are converging to the equality, so these regions are classed with those tending toward integration. With δ > 0, the prices are deterministically diverging; thus, these regions are non-integrated.
If either of H γ and H δ (or both) is not rejected, this means that there is no deterministic trend in the time series. In such an event, as well as in the case of nonrejection of a unit root, it is tested whether law (1) governs the process. We obtain a testable version of Equation (1) as above:
combining these equation gives
which is the conventional AR(1) model.
The hypothesis tested here is whether the time series has a unit root, H λ : λ = 0 (against λ < 0).
Its rejection implies that the time series fluctuates around zero, i.e. around the equality of prices in regions r and s. Therefore, such regions are classed as integrated. If H λ is not rejected, the regions are deemed non-integrated.
Note the different roles of parameters γ and δ vs. parameter λ. The first two characterize the long-run behavior of the price differential path, while λ characterizes the short-run properties of adjustment toward this path. (In the degenerate case of AR(1), the path is a straight line along the time axis that represents price parity.) Parameter λ is interpreted as the rate deviations from the long-run path caused by random shocks die out. Alternatively, t HLS = log(0.5)/log(1 + λ) defines the half-life time of these random price disparities. With a unit root, i.e. λ = 0, t HLS = ∞. Thus, the effect of random shocks is permanent, preventing the price differential from returning to a longrun path; hence, no long-run path exists. With no autocorrelation, i.e. λ = -1, the return to the long-run path is instantaneous: t HLS = 0. Parameter δ is the rate the deterministic price disparity tends to zero. Similarly to the half-life time of random price disparities, the half-life time of the deterministic price disparity can be defined as the time the disparity takes to halve: t HLL = log(0.5)/δ.
There is a peculiarity of price dynamics in Russia that complicates the above analysis. The point is that a number of regional price time series contain a structural break caused by the August 1998 financial crisis in the country. The break point θ is not uniform across regions, varying from 1998:08 through 1999:02. Taking account of this peculiarity produces a number of additional models that are modifications of Equations (5) and (7). Dummy variable B θt such that B θt = 1 if t < θ, and zero otherwise models the structural change.
Incorporating the structural change dummy into Equation (5), it takes the form 
(5**) Hypotheses H λ , H B , and H δ are tested for it. It is seen that this model is a combination of Models (5) and (7). The price differential dynamics is characterized by Model (5) when t < θ; and by Model (7) on the time interval from θ to T. The sign of δ in Model (5**) does not matter, as the behavior of prices after the break is of interest for us. However, the case of δ > 0 would be strange and seems hardly probable in practice. (No one such case occurred among estimates obtained.) Augmenting Model (7) for structural break, we have
To make the values of estimates comparable across models, let us transform the above equation into an equivalent form:
Note that the break dummy B θt is constructed so that the break in this model is always directed toward parity. This is done to test whether regions r and s have become integrated after the date of structural change. This is the case when both hypotheses H λ and H B are rejected. Given γ B > 0, the crisis caused price-cutting in region r as compared to s. It otherwise increased the relative price in r.
Making inferences regarding Models (7*) and (5), two traps are to be avoided. The first is that of a spurious break. Let the path of the price differential is stepwise so that P rst = γ + γ B with t < θ, and P rst = γ with t ≥ θ. As model (7*) assumes γ = 0, it can give a statistically significant estimate of γ B (with rejection of H λ ), taking a typical random shock for the structural break. Hence, it is to be checked whether γ = 0 holds indeed. The second trap is due to that Model (5) can approximate a stepwise path by a deterministic trend, seemingly suggesting that regions r and s are tending toward integration, while they are in fact non-integrated, if γ ≠ 0 in the stepwise path, or integrated, if γ = 0 in it. Thus, we have to discriminate between these three cases. The following auxiliary equation helps to avoid both traps:
(7**) (Note that it is equivalent to ∆P rst = λP rs,t-1 + γ + γ B (B θt -(λ + 1) B θ,t-1 ) + ε t , except for numerical values of γ and γ B .)
Hypotheses H λ , H γ , and H B are tested for Model (7**). We may turn to Model (7*) only when H B is rejected and H γ is not. When all the three hypotheses are rejected, regions r and s are non-integrated, provided that Model (5) is rejected.
If both Models (7**)/(7*) and (5) appear acceptable (H λ , H γ , and H B are rejected for (7**), or H B is rejected and H γ is not for it with rejection of H λ and H B for (7*), and H λ , H γ , and H δ are rejected for (5)), the following specification test based on the Monte Carlo method is performed to choose between them. Denote H 1 : (5) is true specification and H 2 : (7**)/(7*) is true specification.
In the first stage of the test, suppose hypothesis H 1 to hold for a given pair (r, s) and generate N simulations of Model (5) (in the empirical work reported in Section 3, N was equal to 100,000).
That is, compute N series of P rst through Equation (5) with λ, γ, δ, and σ ε estimated on the actual data and ε t ∼ N(0, 2 ε σ ). For each simulation, estimate Models (5) and (7**)/(7*) and calculate their simulated log likelihood ratio (LLR , Model (7**)/(7*) is accepted. In the case that the inferences are inconsistent across the stages, rejecting both hypotheses or neither of them, the J test is performed.
The above set of models may seem involved. In fact, it has a simple and transparent logical structure and can de derived from the only Model (5*). This model encompasses all the rest of models, generating three levels of nesting with setting some subset of its (structural) parameters to zero. Imposing restrictions γ = 0, or δ = 0, or γ B = 0 on Model (5*), we get the first level consisting of three mutually nonnested Models (5**), (7**), and (5), respectively. Restrictions δ = 0 and γ = 0, or δ = 0 and γ B = 0 on Model (5*) generate the second level of nesting that contains Model (7*) and a model omitted in our set, a conventional AR(1) model with constant α = -λlog(1 + γ).
Equivalently, Model (7*) is a result of imposing restriction δ = 0 on Model (5**) or restriction γ = 0 on Model (7**); restriction γ B = 0 on Model (7**) or restriction δ = 0 on Model (5) produces the AR(1) with constant. At last, the only Model (7) represents the third level of nesting. We get it, restricting three parameters in Model (5**), γ = 0 and γ B = 0 and δ = 0. This model can be also generated by restriction γ B = 0 on Model (7*) or by restriction γ = 0 on the AR(1) with constant. Table 1 summarizes the correspondence between models characterizing price dynamics in a pair of regions and types of the regions from this pair. 
(7*)
AR (1) with constant Type of region (7), (7*), and (5**) Integrated (5) with δ < 0, and (5*) with δ < 0
Tending toward integration (7**), (5) with δ > 0, (5*) with δ > 0, and none Non-integrated
The AR(1) model with constant is superfluous for our purposes. Be it accepted for some regions r and s, this would imply that they are non-integrated, as there a permanent price disparity γ between them. But Model (7) gives the same answer for these r and s. Since the model of P rs is misspecified due to omitted constant, a unit root will not be rejected in Model (7), again evidencing non-integration of r and s.
Seemingly, if one of structural parameters in Model (5*) proves to be insignificant, we have to turn to a respective model of the next level. However, this is true only for the case of nonrejection of H γ that leads to Model (5**). But the nonrejection of H δ is not a sign that Model (5) is not valid, as well as the nonrejection of H B does not guarantee invalidity of Model (7**). As noted above, these two models are competitive in characterizing price dynamics, while Model (5**) does not compete with them. At any rate, every time when Model (5**) appeared acceptable, a specification test similar to that described above easily rejected specifications (5) and (7**) in favor of (5**).
Based on the above considerations, the procedure of analyzing each time series {P rt } is as follows:
Step 1. Model (5*) is estimated and tested. If hypotheses H λ , H γ , H B , and H δ are jointly rejected, regions r and s are deemed to be tending to integration in the case of δ < 0 and nonintegrated in the case of δ > 0, {P rst } containing a structural break. Then analysis finishes.
Otherwise, if H B and H δ are rejected, the analysis comes to Step 2, while if this is not the case, the analysis continues at Step 3.
Step 2. Model (5**) is estimated and tested. If hypotheses H λ , H B , and H δ are jointly rejected, r and s are deemed integrated; the analysis finishes. Otherwise, the analysis comes to Step 3.
Step 3. Model (7**) is estimated and tested. If hypotheses H λ , H γ , and H B are jointly rejected, model (7**) is potentially accepted. Anyway the analysis continues at
Step 5 except for the case of nonrejection of H γ , when it comes to Step 4.
Step 4. Model (7*) is estimated and tested. If hypotheses H λ and H B are jointly rejected, model (7*) is potentially accepted. The analysis comes to
Step 5 in any case.
Step 5. Model (5) is estimated and tested. If hypotheses H λ , H γ , H B , and H δ are jointly rejected and neither (7**) nor (7*) has been potentially accepted, r and s are deemed to be tending to integration, given that δ < 0, or non-integrated, given that δ > 0; the analysis finishes. If these hypotheses are rejected but there is a potentially accepted alternative model, the analysis comes to
Step 6. Given insignificant estimates in Model (5) and no potentially accepted model, the analysis comes to Step 7. If there is such a model, it turns from potentially to actually accepted one and the analysis finishes. (In the case that Model (7**) is accepted, r and s are deemed non-integrated;
accepting Model (7*) implies that they are integrated, {P rst } containing a structural break in both cases.)
Step 6. The specification test is performed, choosing between models (7**)/(7 * ) and (5).
Depending on its results, regions r and s are deemed non-integrated, integrated, or tending to integration -if Model (7**) or (5) with δ > 0, or (7*), or (5) with δ < 0 is accepted, correspondingly. Then analysis finishes.
Step 7. Model (7) is estimated and tested. If the unit root hypothesis, H λ , is rejected, r and s are deemed to be integrated and non-integrated otherwise.
Let us consider some technical details of estimations. 4 For testing the unit root hypotheses, H λ , the t-statistic of λ is used. The distributions of this statistic for regressions (5), (5*), (5**), (7*), and (7**) not only are nonstandard, but they also differ from the Dickey-Fuller distributions and have not been documented in the literature. Denote the t-statistics for the respective
, and τ c (θ); argument θ indicates that the distribution depends on break point, θ (τ 0 and τ c with no argument stand for the Dickey-Fuller τ-statistic for Equation (7) and AR(1) with constant, respectively). To derive p-values of the unit root tests, the empirical distributions of these statistics under the null hypothesis of random walk have been estimated with the use of the Monte Carlo method with 1,000,000 simulations. Appendix A reports some results of this work, tabulating selected critical values of the τ-statistics.
To test for a unit root, two tests are employed, which are the Phillips-Perron test and ADF test in the case of Equation (7) and their modifications for other regressions. The unit root hypothesis, H λ , is deemed rejected if both tests reject it. In the Phillips-Perron test, the Phillips (1987) transformation is applied to relevant τˆ, using the Newey-West (1994) automatic bandwidth selection method with the Bartlett spectral kernel. The adjusted value of the τ-statistic determines p-value of the test through p(τ), the respective estimated distribution. (Given Equation (7), this is the Dickey-Fuller distribution of τ 0 .) In the ADF test, the Schwarz information criterion serves for choosing the optimal lag length. In doing so, the lag length varies from 0 to (Ng and Perron, 2005) . Having found the optimal lag length, reestimation of the relevant regression on actual sample yields the adjusted value of the τ-statistic, which, in turn, determines p-value of the ADF test.
To find the break point, Equations (5*) and (7**) are estimated for each possible point, θ = 1998:08,…,1999:02. Then θ that yields the least sum of squared residuals is taken. Equations (5**) and (7*) inherit estimated θ from (5*) and (7**), respectively. (While experimenting with θ estimated in each of the four regressions independently, for the most part the estimates proved to be the same across the models.)
Data
The [1994] [1995] [1996] were obtained directly from Goskomstat. A more detailed description of this data set is given in Gluschenko (2003) .
The data are monthly, spanning 84 months, from January 1994 to December 2000. There are missing observations in the time series used. Most occur in 1994, which has 42 missing observations (4.7% of the yearly total) in 17 regional time series. The remainder of the data set lacks only 9 observations. To fill the gaps, missing prices are approximated by the food component of the regional monthly CPIs. The interpolated value of p rt is the arithmetic mean of the nearest known preceding price inflated to the required time point, t, and the nearest known succeeding price deflated to t. Table 2 below. As is seen, the actual data do tend to exhibit the stylized behavior depicted in Fig. 1 . Fig. 3 (c) additionally demonstrates a case of non-integration.
For this region pair, the Saratov and Magadan oblasts, no one of our models rejects unit root.
Empirical results
The 75 series of regional prices in the data set used yield 2,775 region pairs. Therefore, we need to reduce such a mass of pairwise comparisons. On the other hand, only 74 of the pairs are independent. This makes the reduction of the number of pairs to such a number imminently reasonable. The standard approach in the literature on the law of one price and PPP is to pick some region as a benchmark, using its price as a numeraire. Unfortunately, there are no obvious evidences for a priori choosing a proper benchmark among regions under consideration.
To solve this problem, the estimations were run with taking each of 75 regions as the benchmark in order to select the "best" one. 5 (Thus, this did involve all 2,775 pairs). Appendix C arbitrage can hardly be bilateral since goods are imported only. Therefore, the difficult-to-access regions are reasonably expected to be non-integrated and to remain such in the foreseeable future. The pattern obtained fundamentally differs from the patterns of poor market integration in Russia found for the very early years of transition by Berkowitz et al. (1998) , Gardner and Brooks (1994) , and Goodwin et al. (1999) .
Among integrated region pairs, Model (7) describes price dynamics in 32 cases. Model (7*) is valid for seven pairs, and Model (5**) is valid in the only case of the Kemerovo Oblast. This implies that eight regions had been non-integrated before the structural breaks caused by the 1998 financial crisis and became integrated after the breaks. Thus, the 1998 crisis facilitated price equalizing among Russian regions, improving the pattern of market integration. (The reasons for this will be discussed later.) In three region pairs, the break was upward, suggesting increases in prices relative to the benchmark region; the remaining five cases are those of price-cutting. The half-life times in the group of integrated regions, t HLS , vary from 0.8 to 8.5 months with the average equaling 3.1 months.
The evolution of prices among region pairs tending toward integration is characterized by Model (5) in 13 cases and by the model with break, (5*), in five cases. In two regions only, the Voronezh and Ulyanovsk oblasts, prices rose in the course of convergence to the benchmark price.
Although both have almost the same (estimated) starting disparity, about 25% below the benchmark, their convergence rates sufficiently differ. Expressed as a percentage, |e δ -1|⋅100, the convergence rate equals 5% per month in the Voronezh Oblast and 0.9% per month in the Ulyanovsk Oblast, which yields disparity half-lives, t HLL , equaling 1.1 and 6.4 years, respectively.
A very probable reason is that the government of the Ulyanovsk Oblast maintained low prices in the region by price regulations and subsidies over many years, until the beginning of 2001, so decelerating price convergence. (Regarding this region, see also DeJong, 1999, and Gardner and Brooks, 1994.) In the reminder of this region group, the starting disparity is on average 51% above the benchmark and varies from 21% to 87%. The convergence rate has the band of 0.7% to 10.8% per month with the average of 2.8%. This corresponds to t HLL from 0.5 to 7.8 years, 4.1 years on average. There is a modest negative correlation, -0.383, between positive starting disparities and convergence rates. This suggests that convergence has a weak propensity to be the slower, the greater is the initial disparity. Except for Moscow, the structural breaks decreased price disparities, thus playing again in favor of more integration. 6 Regarding half-lives of random deviations from the long run paths, t HLS , their average over all 18 region pairs of this group is equal to 1.5 months with the variation from 0.7 to 2.8 months.
It is interesting to note that among regions tending toward integration, four can be deemed as becoming integrated by the end of the time span covered because of practically completed convergence. These are the Nizhni Novgorod, Voronezh, Kurgan, and Orenburg oblasts. In January 2000, their estimated disparities, γe δ⋅72 , had values of 0.01%, -0.64%, 0.07%, and 0.13% of the benchmark price, respectively.
There is the only case of deterministic divergence, Model (5*) with δ > 0, among nonintegrated regions. Three price differentials in this region group contain unit root (in fact, the AR(1) with constant and no unit root would be valid for one of them). The rest 12 region pairs have a stepwise path of the price differential that is characterized by Model (7**). Thus, nonintegration was predominantly due to constant (apart from random shocks) price disparities, with one-shot switches, rather then to deterministic or stochastic divergence of prices. Price disparities increased as a result of the 1998 crisis in four out of those 12 region pairs and decreased in eight pairs. (With the only exception, the former are pairs with regions from the European part of Russia, and the latter contain regions from Siberia and the Far East.) This suggests that differences in prices between Russian regions became for the most part smaller after the crisis. No one case is found where a region was integrated before the crisis and became non-integrated after it. The halflives of random deviations, t HLS , among region pairs characterized by Model (7**) vary from 0.8 to 3.1 months with the average of 1.6 months.
Overall, the 1998 crisis strongly affected regional price dynamics. It caused a structural break in about a third of the time series under consideration. The only break is detected in the first month of the crisis, August 1998. The rest of the breaks are almost uniformly distributed among September, November, and December 1998, and January 1999. No one break is found in October 1998 and February 1999. All early breaks, those in September 1998, occurred in the European part 6 The case of Moscow appears strange in general. There is abundant evidence of a special position of Moscow as "a country within a country" (see, e.g., Gluschenko, 2010) . Its market is partitioned off from the Russian market by barriers erected by both the city government and organized crime. Therefore, there are strong grounds to expect Moscow not to move toward integration with any other region. Possibly, the shape of the Moscow price differential path has become by chance (maybe, due to structural break) such that it lends to fitting to Model (5*). However, the question of whether the Moscow prices do exhibit convergence to something else can be answered only by exploring their evolution beyond 2000.
of Russia. In its Asian part, the crisis affected price dynamics with a delay, starting to provoke structural breaks since November 1998 (except for the Republic of Buryatia, where the very early break occurred).
One aspect of the crisis was dramatic devaluation of the Russian currency. By the beginning of 1999, it was devaluated 3.3-fold relative to the end of July 1998. The $/ruble exchange rate increased by 27% during August and by more 103% during September 1998. In October, the exchange rate was more or less stable (which could explain the absence of structural breaks in this month) and rose again during November and December, by 12% and 15%. As a result, domestic goods were displacing those imported from abroad. This caused expansion of inter-regional trade, which, in turn, facilitated improvements in market integration in the country. Besides, this is a reason for prices in many non-integrated regions to become closer to the benchmark price.
The spatial structure of market integration is graphically presented in Fig. 4 . There are only four non-integrated regions in the European part of Russia; the rest of them are in Siberia and the Far East. The farthest integrated regions lie in Western Siberia; there is no one such eastward of it.
Nonetheless, there are five regions tending toward integration with the benchmark region in
Eastern Siberia and the Far East. In the latter, four of five non-integrated regions are difficult-toaccess ones. However, one more region labeled by Gluschenko (2003) as difficult to access, the Murmansk Oblast (in the European part of the country), proves to be tending toward integration. Table 2 for numerical designations of economic areas and regions.
rest of regions. Note moreover that anti-market policy in some Red Belt regions can impede market integration without an influence on our classification of regions. An example is the small convergence rate in the above-discussed Ulyanovsk Oblast.
In general, the extent of market integration in Russia in 1994-2000 seems not to differ much from that in long-standing market economies. For instance, Ceglowski (2003) investigates the law of one price across 25 Canadian cities (country's capital being the benchmark) for each of 45 individual goods, applying the AR(1) model with constant. Averaging data reported in Ceglowski's (2003) Table 2 over these 45 goods markets, the percentage of time series for which unit root can be rejected at the 10% significance level (in our terms, the percentage of integrated city pairs) equals 55%, which is close to the figure for Russia. The introduction of the concept of regions intermediate between integrated and nonintegrated ones, namely, that of regions tending toward integration, was proved to be fruitful in revealing the features of the transition process. Omitting the relevant models, only six of 18 region pairs recognized as tending toward integration can be characterized by Model (7) or (7*). Thus, if the traditional approach to the time series analysis of market integration were used, 46 regions (or 62% of the total) would be deemed as integrated with the benchmark, and 28 regions (38%) would 7 Ceglowski (2003) obtains the average (over goods) of median half-lives of random deviations, t HLS , equaling 0.5 years, while the median t HLS is equal to 0.2 years (2.8 months) for Russian integrated regions. In fact, these figures should be closer, since the half-lives for Canada are computed from λs estimated in the ADF equations which yield, as a rule, a smaller absolute value of λ as compared to our Equation (7) because of additional lags.
be non-integrated. Such a pattern is not encouraging and suggests no indications of its further improvement.
The results obtained shed light on reasons behind the patterns of the evolution of market integration in Russia presented in DeJong (2001, 2003) and Gluschenko (2003) .
The improvement in market integration during 1994-2000, captured by rising an aggregated degree of integration in the former and by falling an aggregated degree of segmentation in the latter, can be assigned to a considerable proportion of regions that tended toward integration. At the same time, non-integrated regions with no such trend did not cause a rise in market segmentation, exhibiting, with the only exception, no price divergence. The changes in the mentioned degrees of integration/segmentation accelerated within several months after the 1998 financial crisis in Russia. Judging from the results obtained here, this is due to that structural breaks induced by the crisis in inter-regional price differentials were nonsynchronous across regions and distributed over a few months.
Overall, the results unambiguously suggest that the Russian market has been moving toward closer integration in 1994-2000, despite anti-integration forces (such as regional protectionism and organized crime; see Gluschenko, 2010) and anti-market policies in a considerable number of regions (predominantly in the Red Belt regions; see Berkowitz and DeJong, 1999) . Among nonintegrated regions, four are difficult-to-access ones. Logically, difficult access presents an insurmountable market friction, so the lack of integration of these regions is more likely due to geographical realities than a particular economic policy, national or regional. The patter obtained appears encouraging and fundamentally differs from the pattern of poor market integration observed in a few initial years of the Russian transition by Berkowitz et al. (1998) , Gardner and Brooks (1994) , and Goodwin et al. (1999) . What is more, the extent of market integration in Model (5*) with δ > 0 Fig. B4 . Non-integrated regions: deterministic divergence.
Note: As there is no one pair with the Saratov Oblast that is fitted to Model (5) with δ > 0, a pair not reported in Table 2 is taken for this case (with γ = -0.045 and δ = 0.017) 
Appendix C: Results across benchmarks
(5**) (7**) (7*) (5), 
(5**) (7**) (7*) (5), To choose between Models (7**)/(7*) and (5), comparison of their estimated log likelihoods was applied rather than the Monte Carlo based specification test; 2. 'Obl.' stands for Oblast and 'Rep.' stands for Republic.
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Appendix D: Full set of estimates is the p-value of the specification test, the null hypothesis being a specification indicated in the second column of a respective row; 3. Standard errors are in parenthesis; 4. Significance at 1% ( *** ), 5% ( ** ), and 10% ( * ); 5. Chosen specification is marked with bold font; 6. NA means that the nonlinear OLS algorithm has failed in estimating relevant regressions; 7. 'Obl.' stands for Oblast and 'Rep.' stands for Republic. a The J test rejects Model (7*) in favor of (5): P (5) enters in Model (7*) significantly (p-value = 0.003), while P (7*) enters in Model (5) insignificantly (p-value = 0.230); P (⋅) is the vector of fitted values of P rs from Model (⋅). b The J test rejects Model (5) in favor of (7**): P (5) enters in Model (7**) with p-value of 0.230, while P (7**) enters in Model (5) with p-value of 0.023.
